Authors
Partner, Disputes, Montréal
Partner, Disputes, Toronto
Partner, Disputes, Calgary
Partner, Disputes, Montréal
Partner, Disputes, Toronto
Partner, Disputes | Insolvency and Restructuring, Montréal
Table of Contents
- Centre d’acquisitions gouvernementales c. Teva Canada limitée,2025 QCCQ 892
- Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia v. Airbnb Ireland UC, 2024 BCCA 333
Privacy Jurisprudence Review
Centre d’acquisitions gouvernementales c. Teva Canada limitée,2025 QCCQ 892
Facts
The appellant, the Centre d’acquisitions gouvernementales (the CAG), a Québec public body, appealed a decision rendered by the Commission d’accès à l’information (the CAI), which ordered the CAG to transmit to the respondent, Teva Canada Limited (Teva), copies of two access to information requests it received as part of the application of the Act respecting Access to documents held by public bodies and the Protection of personal information, C.Q.L.R. c. A-2.1 (the Québec Public Sector Act). Teva had sent a request to the CAG to obtain a copy of these two requests which aimed, in particular, to obtain a copy of a contract entered into with multiple suppliers, including Teva.
The CAI concluded that these access to information requests were held by the CAG in the exercise of its duties. The CAI also determined that the documents requested did not contain personal information, as the access to information requests were made for and on behalf of legal entities.
Decision
The Court dismissed the appeal.
The Court concluded that the CAI did not commit a reviewable error in finding that access to information requests are documents held in the exercise of the duties of a public body, which must be interpreted liberally within the meaning of the Québec Public Sector Act. The Court highlighted that the fact that the constitutive Act of a public body does not specifically provide for its obligation to hold certain documents does not in itself lead to the conclusion that these documents are not held in the exercise of its duties.
Duties of a public body extend to all its main duties, ancillary duties arising from these main duties, duties assumed voluntarily, and activities incumbent upon it by virtue of its constitutive Act or by virtue of a statute of general application, such as the Québec Public Sector Act. Therefore, the Court concluded that the documents requested by Teva in its access to information request were held by the CAG in the exercise of its duties.
Moreover, the Court held that the identity of access to information requesters was not confidential personal information. The Court recalled that the name of a person acting as a representative of a company is not considered confidential personal information if it is not associated with any other significant personal information. Thus, the documents requested by Teva did not contain any confidential personal information within the meaning of the Québec Public Sector Act.
If the legislator wished to establish a fundamental principle aimed at protecting the identity of access to information requesters and the confidentiality of access to information requests themselves, it would have been specified explicitly. The Court reiterated the CAI’s view that it is not its role to create a new exception to the right of access nor to rewrite the Québec Public Sector Act.
Since the Court concluded that no exception to the right of access was applicable in this case, nothing prohibited the CAG from communicating the documents requested to Teva.
Key takeaway
This decision clarifies the scope of the Québec Public Sector Act by affirming that access to information requests are documents held in the exercise of a public body’s duties and that the right of access must be interpreted liberally, unless an exception is expressly provided for in the Québec Public Sector Act.
In addition, the identity of access to information requesters is not confidential personal information within the meaning of this statute if it is not associated with any other significant personal information.
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia v. Airbnb Ireland UC, 2024 BCCA 333
Facts
This appeal concerned the disclosure of information about short-term rental (STR) licensees in the City of Vancouver, collected by the City pursuant to its agreement with Airbnb. In 2018, the City amended its bylaws to require STR operators to obtain licenses, which are issued in the operator’s name and list their home address. Under a Memorandum of Understanding, Airbnb provided the City with hosts’ names, license numbers, home addresses, and email addresses, all deemed “personal information” under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).
A requester sought disclosure of STR hosts’ names, license numbers, and addresses. The City denied the request, citing several FIPPA exceptions, including those related to safety, property security, third-party business interests, and personal privacy. The requester sought review by the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC).
The IPC adjudicator ordered disclosure of certain information, finding that most of the City’s and Airbnb’s concerns about harm were not substantiated, except in one case involving a stalking victim. The adjudicator also determined that STR addresses were “contact information” rather than “personal information,” as they were used for business purposes, and thus not protected from disclosure under section 22 of FIPPA.
Airbnb sought judicial review, arguing that the adjudicator’s interpretation of FIPPA was unreasonable and that hosts should have been given notice and an opportunity to participate in the review. The Supreme Court of British Columbia set aside the IPC’s decision, remitted the matter for reconsideration, and ordered that notice be given to all licensees before reconsideration.
Decision
The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the IPC’s appeal in part, on the sole issue of whether individuals whose information might be disclosed should have notice of the IPC’s consideration of the disclosure. It held that the decision of whether and to whom notice should be given falls within the IPC’s discretion under section 54 of FIPPA.
The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, emphasizing that the adjudicator’s analysis was overly formalistic and failed to properly consider the legislative context and purpose, and the practical privacy implications of disclosing home addresses used for business purposes.
Key takeaway
The case underscores the need for a contextual and purposive approach to the interpretation of “personal information” under FIPPA, particularly where home addresses are used for both personal and business purposes.
